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WHOSE FAULT IN AN AGING WORLD?: 
COMPARING DEMENTIA-RELATED TORT LIABILITY 





Abstract:  Age-related dementias have been identified as a global health priority, 
based on their rapidly rising incidence and associated economic burden.  Behaviors 
symptomatic of dementias, such as wandering, potentially expose sufferers to increased 
likelihood of experiencing harm or causing harms to others.  Yet what jurisprudence and 
case law exists on the issue of tortious liability of people with dementia is largely derived 
from the broader principles governing tortious liability of those with mental illness or 
otherwise impaired capacity.  Those principles are themselves problematic, reflecting 
absolutist models of either personal liability (common law jurisdictions) or statutory 
personal immunity accompanied by imposition of delegated liability on caregivers (civil 
law jurisdictions), rather than a more nuanced model capable of reflecting the fluctuating 
nature of capacity in people with dementia, and the variety of models of care arrangements.  
Similarly, those principles fail to adequately address tensions between paternalism and 
individual autonomy.  This Article provides a comparison of the various models of personal 
or caregiver liability found in a number of key jurisdictions (primarily Japan and the United 
States) and offers some suggestions for jurisdictions considering legal reform in this 
increasingly critical area. 
 
Cite as:  Trevor Ryan & Wendy Bonython, Whose Fault In An Aging World?: Comparing 
Dementia-Related Tort Liability in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions, 27 WASH. 




Dementia—defined broadly as a “clinical syndrome of cognitive 
decline that is sufficiently severe to interfere with social or occupational 
functioning”1—presents significant challenges at all levels of society, 
including for the affected individual, family and friends, caregivers, and 
greater communities.  It is a condition that highlights the tensions between a 
paternalistic societal compulsion to protect individuals from harm to 
themselves or others and the human rights-mandated autonomy of the 
individual—including risk taking.  At the forefront of these challenges is 
                                                 
†  Associate Professor, School of Law and Justice, Faculty of Business Government and Law, 
University of Canberra. 
‡  Associate Professor, School of Law and Justice, Faculty of Business Government and Law, 
University of Canberra. 
1  Howard Chertkow et al., Definitions of Dementia and Predementia States in Alzheimer’s Disease 
and Vascular Cognitive Impairment: Consensus from the Canadian Conference on Diagnosis of Dementia, 
5 (Suppl 1) ALZHEIMER’S RES. & THERAPY S2 (2013). 
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dementia’s effect on legal personhood, aspects of which include decision-
making ability and culpability. 
 
In 2012, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) identified dementia 
as a global health priority.  Its costs to health systems alone were estimated at 
$604 billion USD per year, a figure that will inevitably increase as the world’s 
population ages further given the increasing incidence of dementia later in 
life.2  The WHO demanded “sustained action and coordination . . . across 
multiple levels and with all stakeholders—at international, national, regional 
and local levels.”3  The non-economic impact is harder to quantify, yet it is 
clear that the challenges presented by the increasing disease burden of 
dementia affect caregivers and communities significantly.  In seeking to meet 
these challenges, many jurisdictions increasingly favor informal models of 
care (which are provided altruistically by family members), or alternative 
models of community-based care over institutionalized alternatives.  These 
models have the advantage of being more consistent with the human rights of 
the patient than older models, which rely more extensively on involuntary 
mechanisms of containment and control.  The greater presence in the 
community of persons with reduced capacity does, however, raise a number 
of challenges. 
 
One challenge is that harm may arise from behaviors such as 
wandering: the movement of a person with dementia away from their care 
environment without the knowledge of caregivers.  Wandering may cause the 
individual harm when the person becomes disoriented and lost and, in severe 
cases, injury or death can result from exposure, attacks by animals, collisions 
with vehicles, and other risks.4  Wandering can also lead to the violation of 
personal and property rights of others, triggering litigation against the 
wandering person.  In jurisdictions where an ongoing mental impairment such 
as dementia is regarded as a defense to tortious liability, the person legally or 
actually responsible for his or her care may be sued.  In cases where the person 
who wanders is in formal protective care, such as a nursing home, that liability 
can also be borne by the facility if its policies and practices for patient 
containment are found to be inadequate.5  Even without wandering, harms 
                                                 
2 WORLD HEALTH ORG., DEMENTIA: A PUBLIC HEALTH PRIORITY 94 (2012), 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/dementia_report_2012/en/. 94. 
3  Id. 
4  Jerold E. Rothkoff, Litigating Nursing Home Abuse and Neglect Cases, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2002, at 
12, 16. 
5  At least one author has estimated that so-called “elopement” cases—involving patients who abscond 
either intentionally or through wandering—account for 10% of all cases involving litigation against nursing 
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may occur in the confines of the person’s own home or in care facilities, with 
or without the direct supervision of caregivers.6  Dementia complicates the 
question of intent on the part of the person to engage in particular behaviors 
or cause consequent harm.  Harm-causing behaviors may also be isolated from 
formation of any intention to engage in the behavior, much less to cause the 
consequent harms.  Attributing liability for harm caused by the wandering 
behaviors of defendants with dementia is therefore a challenge for multiple 
jurisdictions. 
 
Though sure to change as the prevalence of dementia increases 
alongside unprecedented population aging, the case law in this area is 
undeveloped.7  Jurisprudence examining the impact of impaired reasoning on 
legal liability has typically centered on criminal liability rather than civil 
liability.8  In criminal law, many jurisdictions have adopted or modified the 
MacNaughton9 rules, which focus on what the defendant subjectively 
understood or intended.  In contrast, jurisprudence governing liability for 
tortious harms caused by people with impaired reasoning as a consequence of 
behaviors associated with their disease is less developed or coherent,10 often 
relying on objective standards—what the reasonable person, without the 
impairment, would have understood, rather than what the person with the 
impairment did understand—with no adjustment for impaired reasoning.11  
Some jurisdictions began with a subjective standard but have since moved to 
an objective one.12 
 
Academic commentary is divided between the need to compensate 
blameless victims and the injustice of holding an impaired defendant liable 
                                                 
homes in the United States. See Leo G. Foxwell, Elopement—Exposure and Control, J. OF LONG-TERM CARE 
ADMIN., Winter 1993–94, at 9. 
6  It has been estimated that the incidence of wandering by people with dementia in community 
settings, for example, is as high as sixth percent.  See Tony Hope et al., Wandering in dementia: a longitudinal 
study, 13 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 137 (2001). 
7  Reasons for the comparatively small body of law may be that many potential cases are resolved 
through settlement, such as those arising from motor vehicle accidents; or that defendants may choose not to 
raise their impairment as factor in mitigation of liability, for fear of stigmatization.  
8  We note the extensive body of case law and scholarship on issues such as contractual and 
testamentary capacity but distinguish it in this context on the basis that a finding of impaired capacity in these 
contexts tends to result in invalidation of the relevant act or decision, rather than providing a defense against 
liability for the consequences of that act or decision, as is the case in tort or criminal law.  
9  Sometimes spelled “M’Naghten.” 
10  Wendy Bonython, The Standard of Care in Negligence: The Elderly Defendant with Dementia in 
Australia, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 119, 127 (2011). 
11  See, e.g., Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234 (Austl.). 
12  Gerhard Wagner, Comparative Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1028 
(Mathias Reinmann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006). 
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for the consequences of actions he or she may have no ability to control.13  
Some jurisdictions (typically code jurisdictions) have granted personal 
immunity from negligence suits to people with impaired capacity, and instead 
impose secondary “caregiver” liability on those who are deemed to have been 
negligent in exercising control over the individual with dementia.  This could 
be a public or private institution, community care provider, family member, 
or other volunteer. 
 
Either approach is problematic when considered against the principles 
underpinning the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(“CRPD”), which entered into force in 2008.14  The Convention applies to 
people with a broad range of disabilities:  physical, mental, sensory, and 
intellectual.  Article 1 of the CRPD states the following: 
 
The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and 
ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to 
promote respect for their inherent dignity. 
 
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in 
interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the CRPD’s emphasis on “full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” applies to people 
with cognitive impairment, including dementia.  Most academic and public 
commentary on the implications of compliance with the Convention has 
focused on issues such as involuntary detention and treatment of people with 
mental illness.  That focus is now broadening to encompass other implications 
for legal systems engaging with people with mental and cognitive impairment 
disabilities including: the franchise, financial management, and liability.  
                                                 
13  For detailed reviews of the case law on mentally ill defendants in trespass and negligence in the 
USA, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and Australia, see generally Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in 
Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924); Pamela Picher, The Tortious Liability of the 
Insane in Canada, 13 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 193 (1975); Stephanie Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in 
Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983); LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON THE LIABILITY IN TORT 
OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS (1985) (Ir.), 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rLiabilityMentallyDisabled.htm; Nikki Bromberger, 
Negligence and Inherent Unreasonableness, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 411 (2010). 
14  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. As of April 
2016, the Convention has 162 parties.  
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Article 12 of the CRPD—Equal recognition before the law—requires, 
among other things, that persons with disabilities “enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”15  It also requires that States 
provide people with disabilities appropriate supportive measures to exercise 
that legal capacity and safeguards to prevent abuse, “proportional and tailored 
to the person’s circumstances” for “the shortest time possible” and subject to 
“competent, independent and impartial” oversight.16  For the purposes of 
interpreting the Article, legal capacity has been defined as “the ability to hold 
rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise these rights and duties (legal 
agency).”17  Included within that range of legal rights and duties are likely to 
be the rights and duties forming the substrate of tortious liability, at least as 
far as involves relationships between people with dementia and public or state 
entities, such as care providers and other state agencies.  It may be argued that 
the CRPD only formally affects relations between the state and the individual 
rather than between private individuals.  Yet many institutional care providers 
and potential plaintiffs, such as transportation services, are publicly funded or 
owned.  Therefore, countries seeking full compliance with the Convention 
must adopt a consistent approach to all litigation involving claims of harm 
caused by people with dementia—regardless of the public or private nature of 
the respective parties.  Alternatively, they must accept a two-tier system of 
determining liability, where litigation between private actors—as claimants or 
caregiver defendants—is determined according to one set of rules, and 
litigation involving a public actor is determined under another. 
 
Article 12 has been widely interpreted to require that states replace 
“substituted” decision-making with “supported” decision-making.  A 
“supported” decision is one in which the person with the disability (including 
what might traditionally be viewed as a lack of capacity) is provided 
assistance to reach his or her own decisions.  A “substitute” model is one in 
which an appointed decision-maker makes decisions on his or her behalf.18  In 
many jurisdictions, efforts to comply with Article 12 have included 
widespread reform of legal mechanisms for substituted and delegated 
                                                 
15  Id. at art. 12.  
16  Id.  
17  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, Art. 12: Equal 
Recognition before the Law, UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, at ¶ 13 (2014). 
18  See, e.g., Terry Carney, Supported Decision-Making for People with Cognitive Impairments: An 
Australian Perspective?, 4 LAWS 37 (2015); Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable 
Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013); Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal 
Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult 
Road From Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8 (2012). 
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decision-making, particularly where such decision-making power is vested in 
a substitute by a tribunal or other legal mechanism, rather than by the person’s 
own nomination through a prior enduring power of attorney appointment.19 
 
Understandably, most of the reform has focused on people with 
impaired decision-making capacity in the context of major considered or 
deliberative decisions, such as financial or legal decision-making.  Few 
reforms have considered the impact Article 12 should have on the personal 
liability of people who are unable to foresee the consequences of their actions 
due to their disability, impairing their short-term decision-making ability.  
Decisions of this type—those that are affected by the person’s inability to 
foresee the consequences of a decision—have the highest probability to result 
in harms giving rise to a negligence claim. 
 
Retaining personal liability is problematic from a CRPD perspective in 
both common law and civil law systems.  The common law model holds 
people with a disability (such as dementia) to a standard those without a 
disability are unlikely to encounter, that is to avoid harm beyond one’s 
capacity to foresee or prevent.  Such liability may also be a failure to ensure 
no “arbitrary deprivation of property” under Article 12.  The civil law model 
is a paternalistic approach that denies dementia-affected people autonomy, 
and instead subjects them to the control of others, while imposing liability for 
the negligent exercise of that control on people who may not willingly—or 
knowingly—assume it. 
 
Wandering—and dementia more broadly—also raises new and 
enduring questions of policy and principle for tort law.  With regard to policy, 
Professor Edward P. Richards frames the issue as finding a judicious path 
through the poles of liability and immunity and exploring alternative forms of 
compensation and prevention.20  The optimum balance, he says, will ensure 
that the law protects and compensates victims without creating disincentives 
to undertake caregiver roles21 or incentives for excessive restraint or 
                                                 
19  In Australia, see, e.g., VICTORIAN PARLIAMENT LAW REFORM COMM., INQUIRY INTO POWERS OF 
ATTORNEY, (PARLIAMENTARY PAPER NO. 352) 225–27 (2010); VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, 
GUARDIANSHIP: FINAL REPORT 24 (2012); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, OLDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW 99 (2007); N.S.W. LAND AND PROP. MGMT. AUTH., 
REVIEW OF THE POWERS OF ATTORNEY ACT 2003 12 (2009). 
20  Edward P. Richards, Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries Caused by Persons 
with Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 GA. L. REV. 621, 622, 649 (2001). Richards is Professor of Health and Public 
Policy Law at Louisiana State University Law School. 
21 Id. at 622. 
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surveillance of dementia sufferers,22 lest this contravene the fundamental 
rights of persons with disabilities. 
 
With regard to principle, wandering and the advent of the CRPD bring 
a new lens to familiar controversies about the fundamental justifications for 
tort law.  If sanction for fault is considered the key justification for attributing 
liability, difficult questions emerge such as the capacity of a person with 
dementia to meet a reasonable standard of care23 and the moral culpability of 
altruistic caregivers.  If general or specific deterrence of accidents is the 
fundamental concern, the question is whether the law of unintentional torts 
can realistically shape the behavior of dementia-affected persons and their 
beleaguered caregivers.  Finally, if compensation and fair distribution of loss 
are the primary goals, the question arises as to whether tort law is the best 
means of achieving these goals.  This is particularly the case where the victim 
of an accident is reluctant to sue those with dementia or their families, or 
where there are difficulties ascertaining the details of an incident where a party 
to an accident suffers from dementia.24  Instead, collectivized, no-blame 
models of social insurance, such as New Zealand’s accidental injury liability 
scheme,25 may provide useful guides for grappling with this emerging social 
issue. 
 
This Article evaluates existing models for the treatment of wandering-
related accidents in tort law and makes recommendations for reform in this 
area.  Part II describes the default common law position of imposing liability 
for harm caused by persons with mental impairment.  This Article examines 
an underlying tension between policy goals that promote care-giving behavior 
on the one hand and concern for public safety on the other, but also the 
potential for how these goals can be pursued simultaneously.  Part III analyzes 
the concept of caregiver liability in lieu of direct liability for persons with 
mental impairment.  It identifies in the divergent approaches among 
jurisdictions common tensions in matters of principle and policy.  In Part IV, 
the Article focuses on the evolving position of Japan because of its recent 
appellate consideration of this issue, legal hybridity and eclecticism, and its 
status as the world’s most rapidly aging society, which has made wandering a 
recognized social problem.  Police statistics for 2015 indicate that a record 
                                                 
22  Id. 
23  Bonython, supra note 10, at 133. 
24  Masuda Jun, Anzen, anshin na shakai to kōreisha jiko no hōri [Legal Principles of a Safe and Secure 
Society and Accidents Involving the Elderly], 6 CHŪO LŌ JĀNARU [CHŪO L.J.] 39, 44 (2009) (Japan). 
25  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 (N.Z.). 
                        WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL               VOL. 27 NO. 2  414
12,208 people suffering from dementia were reported missing and 479 of 
these were deceased when located, having met with accidents or due to 
exposure or dehydration.26  One newspaper reports that 115 people with 
dementia died in train accidents alone between 2004 and 2012.27  Part V 
attempts a deeper comparative analysis of the nature and justifications for 
caregiver liability and introduces competing models of how interventions can 
be justified in the lives of persons with mental impairment in the name of 
public safety.  The Article concludes that, absent a publicly funded no fault 
compensation scheme, the fairest option is a model that apportions joint 
liability between caregivers and people with dementia based on a subjective 
assessment of the parties’ circumstances.  Such a model would permit 
recognition of fluctuating and variable capacity on the part of the person 
affected.  It would also comply with human rights norms and the primacy of 
the rights and interests of the person under care without imposing an 
intolerable burden on altruistic or professional caregivers.  The Article also 
proposes some strict conditions to allow derivation of caregiver liability from 
the care relationship in the name of compliance with the CRPD and 
contemporary expectations. 
 
 This introduction ends with a note of caution, namely that the 
jurisdictions considered in this Article differ in significant ways, including 
legal tradition, culture, and the social-policy context.  In Japan, Australia, and 
the United Kingdom, for example, professionally provided aged and acute 
care is often fully funded or subsidized by the state or compulsory insurance 
premiums, and there are typically extensive state-based licensing and 
accreditation requirements imposed on care providers.  Findings of caregiver 
liability, therefore, could potentially result in damages awards being borne by 
the taxpayer, both directly and through liability claims directed at the state 
regulator for failure to adequately regulate.28  Conversely, in jurisdictions such 
as the United States where aged care is typically privately funded, there may 
be greater appetite to hold professional caregivers liable, as damages awards 
                                                 
26  Record 12,000 people with dementia reported missing in Japan in 2015, JAPAN TIMES (June 16, 
2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/16/national/social-issues/record-12000-people-
dementia-reported-missing-japan-2015/#article_history. 
27  Ninchishō: 115-nin tetsudō jikoshi, izoku ni baishō seikyū mo [Dementia: 115 Deaths from Railway 
Accidents, Even Compensation Claims Against the Bereaved], MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20140112k0000m040087000c.html. In the 2014–2015 Japanese financial 
year, 1165 persons with dementia had their licenses revoked under new rules introduced to ensure that drivers 
do not pose a threat through illness. 7711 driver’s licenses revoked, suspended due to illness, JAPAN TIMES 
(July 16, 2015).  
28  Noting that the latter obstacle could be overcome by implementation of a statutory provision 
granting immunity from negligence for the regulator.  
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will not be funded by the taxpayer.  Another significant difference is that some 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, typically do not award damages for 
pure economic loss,29 but this is not the case in other jurisdictions, such as 
Japan and many common law jurisdictions. 
 
Certainly, the difference between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions should not be ignored, no less the apparent schism between the 
civil law delict and the common law of torts.  On the other hand, this overlooks 
common developments within each tradition and shared roots in Roman law, 
which are examined below.30  It is also possible to speculate that common law 
courts (especially in the United States) are reluctant to impose liability upon 
caregivers because of a stronger ethos of individualism and self-
responsibility.31  In contrast, Japanese law may be imbued with more 
collectivist or communitarian values.32  Yet, even if this is true, shared 
demographic and industrial changes may be forging convergence toward 
collectivization of loss beyond the immediate parties and their families, that 
is, through liability insurance and greater support for caregivers in the wider 
community.  While contextual differences must be accounted for, there is a 
danger that they may be overstated to the detriment of fruitful comparative 
analysis.  After all, accidents occur in all jurisdictions, which may explain 
why tort law continues to be a major area of comparative law and a focus of 
regional harmonization efforts.33 
 
II. LIABILITY OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL IMPAIRMENT 
 
This Part examines the approaches of selected common law 
jurisdictions to the tortious liability of persons with mental impairment, 





                                                 
29  See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). This is not true of all 
U.S. states. See, e.g., J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985); Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 359–
61 (Alaska 1987). 
30  Wagner, supra note 12, at 1007. 
31  Bruce Jennings, Freedom Fading: On Dementia, Best Interests, and Public Safety, 35 GA. L. REV. 
593, 596 (2001). 
32  TAKAO TANASE, COMMUNITY AND THE LAW: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN 
LIBERALISM AND JAPANESE MODERNITY 141 (Luke Nottage & Leon Wolff eds. And trans., 2010). 
33  Wagner, supra note 12, at 1007. 
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A. Legal Status of People with Mental or Cognitive Impairment 
 
Common law responses to people with mental impairment have been 
somewhat incoherent.  While it is well established that people who commit 
crimes while “lacking reason” should not be punished for those crimes, it was 
not until the sensational trials of Hadfield34 and MacNaughten35 in the 
Victorian era that the formal framework of the insanity plea, coupled with 
provisions for “protective” imprisonment, emerged.36  Although the 
MacNaughten defense, as it came to be known, has since undergone 
significant reform in many common law jurisdictions, the crux of the defense 
still rests on the basis that it is wrong to punish someone for criminal conduct 
when their mental impairment prevented them from knowing that such 
conduct was wrong, or prevented them from resisting that conduct. 
 
Rather than being predicated on a formal diagnosis, access to the 
insanity-type defenses in criminal matters rests on questions of subjective 
functional capacity:  what did the accused understand or intend?  If the 
accused has a diagnosed mental illness or impairment, for example, but the 
impairment did not affect the accused’s ability to understand the nature or 
criminality of his or her act at the time of commission, the defense will not be 
available.  Conversely, in the absence of a specific diagnosis, but with clear 
evidence of an impairment affecting the accused’s ability to understand the 
nature of the act, an accused will be able to access the defense.  This emphasis 
on functionality over formality is also reflected in the common law response 
to many other aspects of self-determination and legal personhood, such as 
testamentary capacity and the appointment of guardians. 
 
The starting point for this common law response is the 1869 decision 
of Banks v. Goodfellow, which established the common law test for 
testamentary capacity: 
 
                                                 
34  See Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial of Treason for James 
Hadfield (1800), 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 487, 488–89. 
35  See Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, “Literature as Law”: The History of the Insanity Plea and a 
Fictional Application within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 381, 390–93 (1999). 
36  Significantly, a successful pleading of the insanity defense generally results in the defendant being 
acquitted of the offence; however, unless the defendant can demonstrate successfully that they no longer pose 
a risk of further offending, they are likely to be referred to a forensic tribunal which, in many jurisdictions, 
has the power to impose a period of hospitalization or psychiatric treatment, potentially of longer duration 
than the maximum sentence for the offense.  
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[A] testator [a] shall understand the nature of the act and its 
effects; [b] shall understand the extent of the property of which 
he is disposing; [c] shall be able to comprehend and appreciate 
the claims to which he ought to give effect; and with a view to 
the latter object, [d] that no disorder of the mind shall poison his 
affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of 
his natural faculties—that no insane delusion shall influence his 
will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it 
which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.37 
 
This test has been modified in various contexts related to guardianship 
and decision-making law more broadly through legislative and common law 
reform.  The United Kingdom’s Mental Capacity Act 2005, for example, 
defines someone as “unable to make a decision for himself” (lacking capacity) 
as a person with an inability “(a) to understand the information relevant to the 
decision, (b) to retain that information, (c) to use or weigh that information as 
part of the process of making the decision, or (d) to communicate his decision 
(whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).”38  The section 
also formally recognizes that a requirement for simplified explanations of 
relevant information and that an ability to retain the relevant information for 
only a short period does not prevent someone from being regarded as “able to 
make a decisions,” thereby specifically addressing circumstances commonly 
encountered by people with dementia.39  The common law has also embraced 
a rebuttable presumption of capacity in adults,40 which is commonly reflected 
in legislation.41 
 
This functional, transaction-specific approach is a departure from the 
historical approach.  In the past, declarations of incapacity were 
comprehensive:  a person lacking the capacity to make a decision was 
presumed to lack capacity to make any decision.  In more recent periods, the 
powers of appointed or substituted decision-makers have been less absolute, 
typically covering specific classes of decisions, such as financial, health, or 
                                                 
37  Banks v. Goodfellow [1870] L.R. 5 Q.B. 549 (Ir.). 
38  Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, § 3 (Eng.). 
39  Id. Similar principles have also been adopted in other jurisdictions through the common law. See, 
e.g., Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 (Austl.). 
40  See, e.g., Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 (Austl.); In Re 
MB [1997] 2 FCR 514 (Eng.). 
41  See, e.g., Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld.) (Austl.). 
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welfare-related decisions.42  Furthermore, appointed decision-makers are 
increasingly bound by requirements to consider the wishes of the person upon 
whose behalf they are acting. 
 
Guardianship law continues to evolve in tandem with international 
human rights norms.  The CRPD mandates the development of more nuanced 
models of “supported” decision-making, in preference to fully substituted 
decision-making, to ensure that people with impaired capacity retain their 
legal decision-making powers to the maximum extent possible.  This is 
particularly significant in dealing with people with dementia, who frequently 
experience fluctuating capacity.  That is, depending on the nature of their 
condition, they may have a greater ability to understand the consequences of 
particular legal decisions at some times than at others. 
 
Precisely how the CRPD should be complied with is contested by 
States, with many States adopting different interpretations of the CRPD from 
those espoused by the CRPD Committee.  Article 12 could be superficially 
interpreted as rendering all tests for legal capacity largely moot, as such tests 
have operated as the threshold for decision substitution rather than support.  A 
more nuanced view recognizes that such a position would effectively deny 
people the right and autonomy to have their wishes respected where these are 
expressed prior to the occurrence of serious illness or disease through an 
advanced care directive or enduring power of attorney, typically conditional 
on loss of decision-making capacity.  Furthermore, for people who are at the 
most extreme end of the spectrum of illness and impairment—for example, 
those who are persistently unconscious—strict applications of Article 12 
provide little scope for recognition of their rights under a supportive 
framework.  The practical implications of caring for people who legitimately 
cannot exercise legal capacity on their own behalf, therefore, means that tests 
for legal capacity of the type described above are likely to retain relevance for 
the foreseeable future, even if this capacity is presumed. 
 
The retention of tests for capacity also allows for a certain degree of 
subjectivity, tailored to the specific circumstances of the person involved.  
Unfortunately, as described in the next section, principles defining tortious 
liability of people with intellectual or mental impairment have not developed 
in a similar manner.  Instead, the common law has adopted a rigid approach 
                                                 
42  See, e.g., Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, § 16 (Eng.); Guardianship and Management of Property 
Act 1991 (ACT) ss 7–8 (Austl.). 
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to the liability of people with mental impairment for harms committed in tort, 
disregarding their personal circumstances. 
 
B. Tortious Liability of Dementia Sufferers 
 
Courts in common law jurisdictions generally hold that ongoing mental 
impairment does not justify any deviation from the objective “reasonable 
person” standard used to measure any other defendant’s conduct.43  The 
standard is therefore neither individual-subjective (reasonableness given the 
actual circumstances of the person) nor class-subjective (reasonableness 
adjusted to the type of impairment).  This contrasts markedly with the criminal 
law tests of insanity and well-established jurisprudence permitting adjustment 
to the “reasonable person” standard of care in the case of physical illness or 
disability, at least those of sudden onset.44 
 
There are a number of arguments in policy and principle for applying 
an objective standard to defendants with a mental impairment.  First, in a 
criminal context, the test is linked to concepts of mens rea and guilt that have 
no exact equivalents in civil cases, which apply a different standard of proof 
and usually have less severe consequences for the liberty of the defendant.  
Second, a subjective test suffers from a deficit of “administrability.”  A finder 
of fact, especially a jury, may find it difficult to determine what constitutes a 
reasonable standard of behavior for a person with a particular mental disability 
or illness.  A third doctrinal reason adopted in the Australian case of Carrier 
v. Bonham is that mental impairment, unlike a given stage of childhood, is too 
idiosyncratic a condition to warrant a class-subjective standard.45  A fourth 
justification, also from Carrier, is that where mental impairment has deprived 
a person of capacity (here, taken as reason itself), it precludes any prospect of 
reasonableness, whether assessed subjectively or objectively.46  A fifth reason 
is that a departure from a common standard would merely entrench the 
marginalization of persons who deviate from mainstream society in their 
degree of mental capacity.47 
 
                                                 
43  See, e.g.,Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Eng.); Adamson v. Motor Vehicle Ins. 
Trust (1957) 58 WALR 56 (Eng.); Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234 (Austl.). 
44  See, e.g., Leahy v Beaumont (1981) 27 SASR 290 (Austl.); Roberts v. Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 
823 (Eng.); Waugh v. James K. Allan Ltd. [1964] S.C. (H.L.) 102 (Eng.); Scholz v Standish [1961] SASR 
123 (Austl.); Mansfield v. Weetabix, [1997] 1 WLR 1263 (Eng.). 
45  Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234 at ¶ 37 (Austl.). 
46  Id. at ¶ 8. 
47 Id. at ¶ 37. 
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More nuanced approaches are available.  There is a growing 
understanding of the diverse types and causes of mental impairment, its 
prevalence, and how to achieve more reliable diagnoses.  As such, greater 
predictability of the progression of particular conditions such as dementia is 
increasingly possible, thereby removing it from the scope of “personal 
idiosyncrasy.”  With this knowledge, it should be theoretically possible to 
group individuals within classes, which are susceptible to class-subjective 
standards of reasonableness, or to regard mental impairment as comparable to 
other (i.e. physical) impairments,48 which are accorded a greater degree of 
flexibility.  Accordingly, factors such as the ability of tortfeasors and potential 
victims to control for the particular impairment would have a bearing on the 
question of what is reasonable in the circumstances.49 
 
In practice in the case of dementia, however, which is attributable at 
least in part to physical causes such as organic deterioration of the brain, 
proposals for recognizing a class-subjective standard have encountered 
resistance on at least two fronts.  First, the progressive, fluctuating nature of 
dementia complicates the question of what standard of reasonableness should 
be applied.  Second, sufferers impaired by dementia, especially those with 
Alzheimer’s disease, may be unaware of their impairment itself, which makes 
it difficult to determine what constitutes a reasonable precaution against harm 
in the circumstances. 
 
Countervailing arguments supporting recognition of a class-subjective 
standard include the following.  First, the disparate stages of dementia are well 
documented and could provide a baseline for class-subjective standards.  
Second, some harms may be causally related to a specific physiological 
manifestation of dementia that may enliven a sudden incapacitation defense, 
that is constituting a factor that no reasonable person in the circumstances 
could have prevented.  For example, one U.S. court has accepted expert 
medical evidence that the cause of a car accident may have been a “sensory 
overload caused by Alzheimer’s disease.”50  Finally, the remaining capacity 
of dementia sufferers to make decisions (and thus to adopt a reasonable 
standard of care) should be respected in light of the development of 
international human rights norms relating to mental disability discussed 
above. 
 
                                                 
48  Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029. See also Bromberger, supra note 13, at 435. 
49  Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029. 
50  Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 145–46 (N.C. 1999). 
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A related question is whether to impose any liability at all upon those 
with significant mental impairments.  This raises questions of justice, 
principle, and policy.  In the common law, courts have sometimes invoked the 
principle that “where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should 
be borne by the one who occasioned it.”51  Furthermore, courts have invoked 
policy reasons for imposing liability:  first, preventing false claims of 
incapacity; and second, creating an incentive for family members with a future 
stake in the estate of the person liable to “restrain and control” persons who 
may be dangerous for reasons of mental impairment.52  In contrast, in a line 
of cases in the United States, the courts have created an exception from 
liability for persons with mental impairment for harm caused to professional 
caregivers in institutions.53  The policy rationale regarding incentives of 
family members is not considered applicable because the family has already 
done everything reasonable to restrain the potentially dangerous person by 
admitting them to care.54 
 
Assistant Professor Sarah E. Light is unconvinced, deriding the 
American Law Institute’s view that “if mental defectives are to live in the 
world they should pay for the damage they do.”55  Light sees in this view a 
fearful, segregationist view of mental disabilities reflecting a long legacy of 
discrimination, prejudice, xenophobia, and coercion.56  Light argues that the 
doctrine developed by the courts unnecessarily “articulates a norm of 
confinement.”57 
 
For example, the “one of two innocents” principle creates incentives 
for confinement of family members with dementia58 despite being “inherently 
unjust,” “nothing more than a statement of strict liability,” and failing to 
consider alternative forms of compensation.59  For the same reason, Light is 
critical of the policy rationale that family members with a stake in inheritance 
should have an incentive to restrain and control.60  Light sees in this a mere 
                                                 
51  Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970). 
52  Id. 
53  See Sarah Light, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the Mentally Disabled 
Under Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381, 400 (1999). Light is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business 
Ethics at The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania. 
54  See, e.g., Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996). 
55  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
56  Light, supra note 53, at 389–90. 
57  Id. at 381. 
58  Id. at 386. 
59  Id. at 387. 
60 Id. at 389. 
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reinforcement of the norm of confinement toward institutionalization.61  At 
the same time, she questions whether this norm is capable of bringing about 
the precise behavior modification anticipated by the courts.62  This is because 
of poor public awareness of this obscure legal doctrine, mistaken assumptions 
about the capacity for family control, and misapprehensions about both the 
amounts of inheritable wealth at stake and the relative importance of this in 
shaping family members’ motives.63  More insidiously, it entrenches a de 
facto double standard, where the standard of care exercised by family 
members in caring is presumably higher where there is potential for the family 
member to inherit, and lower if the affected relative is impecunious.  The 
negative and discriminatory message sent by the courts through articulating 
this norm of confinement therefore outweighs any possible benefit to public 
safety. 
 
III. CAREGIVER LIABILITY 
 
If the person with mental impairment is indeed an unsuitable defendant 
for legal, moral, or economic reasons, a plaintiff may look to a caregiver as 
an alternative or joint defendant.  The nature of this liability is far from settled.  
In Roman law, the head of a family owed strict liability for the acts of family 
members.64  In other cultures with patrilineal families, such as Japan, similar 
rules applied, though it is debatable whether the origins were indigenous or 
traceable to imported codes.65  Neither strict liability nor vicarious liability are 
precisely applicable for caregiver liability where harm is caused to a third 
party by a person with mental impairment.  Strict liability on the part of a 
principal, for example, typically requires the agent to demonstrate fault.66  
Furthermore, vicarious liability is usually wedded to the concept of enterprise 
liability.67  Additionally, it is not clear what is meant by a “caregiver” in the 
concept of caregiver liability.  Typically, this term is used to define someone 
who provides some form of material assistance to another.  “Caregiver 
liability” could equally refer to the less proximate role of watching out for 
another, in which case “supervisory liability” may be a more appropriate term.  
For the purposes of this Article, the term “caregiver liability” is used to avoid 
                                                 
61 Id. at 400. 
62  Id. at 392. 
63  Id. at 392–93. 
64  Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029. 
65  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 1, 2016, 2014 (Ju) 1434, 70 (3) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [MINSHŪ] 681 
(Japan).  
66  Wagner, supra note 12, at 1029. 
67  Id. 
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begging the question of what the role entails and how it might generate 
liability to third parties. 
 
Caregiver liability is fraught with the same problems identified by Light 
above, particularly with the potential expression of a norm of confinement.  
Indeed, it may conflict with another line of case law that imposes tortious 
liability on professional caregivers (though not necessarily family caregivers) 
for unwarranted deprivation of liberty.68  It is also questionable whether 
caregiver liability is consistent with the common law tradition’s reluctance to 
impose on defendants a positive duty for omissions or otherwise to take action 
to prevent harms not of their own making.  As explored in greater detail below, 
this problem may be overcome by positive statutory duties.69  Nevertheless, 
there are some possible foundations for caregiver liability in the common law. 
 
A. The United States 
 
While the basic position in the United States is one of personal liability 
on the part of persons with mental impairment, there is a line of cases 
considering caregiver liability.  These cases fall within a broader, developing 
area of negligence law in which a range of defendants, including vendors of 
weapons,70 spouses of sexual predators,71 schools,72 parents,73 police 
conducting surveillance,74 and employment referees,75 have been argued to be 
liable for the harmful actions of a third party. 
 
Due to a range of policy concerns including insurance costs and the 
realities of care, courts in the United States have, in imposing liability upon 
caregivers, tended to distinguish between professional caregivers and 
informal caregivers.76  There are a number of cases relating to care institutions 
where a person was released from institutional care and then proceeded to 
cause harm to a third party.77  In these cases, the courts have required specific 
                                                 
68  See P v. Cheshire West [2014] UKSC 19 (Eng.). 
69  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
70  Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999); Buczkowski v. McKay, 490 N.W.2d 330 
(Mich. 1992); Gallara v. Koskovich, 836 A.2d 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).   
71  J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).  
72  District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30 (D.C. 1987). 
73  Moore v. Crumpton, 285 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).  
74  Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1982).   
75  Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).  
76  Edward P. Richards, Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries Caused by Persons 
with Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 GA. L. REV. 621, 648 (2001). 
77  Id. at 649. 
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evidence that the person posed a threat before liability is imposed.78  Courts 
have also been reluctant to allow a concern with protecting third parties to 
interfere with the rehabilitative goals informing administrative decisions to 
reintegrate inmates of institutions into the community.79  There are also cases 
that consider the duty of care an institution owes third parties harmed by a 
person currently in its care.  These typically involve the question of whether 
injuries inflicted on another patient or resident were foreseeable.80  However, 
in Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, the Florida District Court of 
Appeals found an institution liable for failing to prevent a person with 
dementia from causing harm to an external third party by driving a car.81  This 
was based on general principles underlying the articulation of the “duty to 
control conduct of third persons” in section 315 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts,82 as interpreted by the Court: 
 
[T]here is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to 
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless:  (a) a 
special relation exists between the actor and the third person 
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s 
conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the 
other which gives to the other a right to protection.83 
 
Consistent with the subsequent re-articulation of this principle in 
section 41 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,84 the Court held that the 
assumption of control by the institution over the patient constituted a special 
relation with the patient and found the institution liable.85  The control in this 
case was assumed through the presence of locked gates designed to prevent 
wandering, but also strategies that had attempted to prevent the person with 
dementia from driving, whether these were strictly authorized by law or not.86  
The corollary is that where there was no such assumption of control, there 
would be no liability.  Professor Richards supports this view, arguing that 
from a public policy perspective the duty to the public and the duty to the 
                                                 
78  Id. 
79  Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234–35 (Ariz. 1977); Sherrill v. Wilson, 
653 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Mo. 1983). 
80  Vaughn E. James, No Help for the Helpless: How the Law has Failed to Serve and Protect Persons 
Suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 407, 434–35 (2012). 
81  Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
82  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 55, at § 315. 
83 Garrison Retirement Home, 484 So.2d at 1261. 
84  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 69, at § 41. 
85  Garrison Retirement Home, 484 So. 2d at 1259. 
86  Id. at 1262. 
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patient are “mutually reinforcing” and should indeed be merged, a notion this 
Article returns to below.87 
 
Despite the public policy context reinforcing a distinction between 
professional and family care in the United States, the logic behind the 
rationale for imposing liability upon persons with mental impairments is 
equally applicable to informal caregivers.  That is, a concern over personal 
liability and future inheritance creates an incentive for family members to 
restrain and control a potentially dangerous individual.88  However, as 
Richards observes, United States courts have been reluctant in a family 
context to endorse this “norm of confinement” as formulated by Light.89  In 
Emery v. Littlejohn, the Washington Supreme Court found the defendants not 
liable after the plaintiff was shot by the defendant’s adult son while he was 
under the defendant’s care, having been released from a mental institution.90  
The Court allowed room for a general duty to the public on the part of a 
“private person having the legal custody and control of a violently insane 
person with homicidal tendencies” grounding liability for “want of care and 
restraint” where there is clear evidence that dangerous behavior was 
foreseeable.91  However, the Court was reluctant to articulate even this very 
high threshold due to the lack of an exact precedent.92 
 
The possibility of informal caregiver liability was present in the (now-
superseded) Restatement (Second) of Torts section 319 (1965) relating to 
persons with “dangerous propensities”:  
 
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or 
should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not 
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control 
the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.93 
 
Despite this, United States case law has affirmed the very high 
threshold in Emery for liability that arises from the care and control of family 
members with a mental impairment.  To begin with, a duty has been held to 
                                                 
87  Richards, supra note 76, at 652. 
88  Id. at 653. 
89  Id. 
90  Emery v. Littlejohn, 145 P. 423, 428 (Wash. 1915). 
91  Id. at 350. 
92  Id.  
93  AM. LAW INST., supra note 55, at § 319–20. 
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arise only where control over the person is assumed voluntarily.94  To flesh 
out what “voluntary” assumption of control might mean in such cases, 
Richards uses examples from cases that consider whether defendants have 
voluntarily taken responsibility for a child’s care.95  These cases in turn 
consider the liability of volunteers in employment contexts:  the undertaking 
to brace a wall, say, even where to do so was not itself a duty, brings with it 
liability to use “reasonable skill and care” in the performance of the work.96  
A comparable duty also attaches to an undertaking to control and supervise a 
child beyond a mere invitation to a “social guest.”97  The assumption of the 
duty must also be specific:  for example, simply providing one’s home to be 
used as a residence in a general sense may be insufficient to constitute 
assumption of the duty.98  Furthermore, liability will only proceed from an 
actual ability to control.99  The threshold of liability is then determined largely 
by whether the caregiver had notice with regard to the threat, which was 
therefore foreseeable.100 
 
For example, in Alva v. Cook, the California Court of Appeals found 
two sisters not liable when their mentally ill adult brother shot and killed the 
plaintiff, stating that: 
 
In the absence of ultimate facts that [the brother] was dangerous 
to himself and others at least sufficient to warrant a reasonable 
assumption that a petition for evaluation or commitment . . . 
would be granted, we are not ready to equate respondents’ 
assumption of a moral obligation to a guarantee and 
indemnification agreement in respect of [the brother’s] conduct 
on or off respondents’ premises as if he were a dog and to hold 
that respondents are their brother’s keeper but at their risk.101 
 
Professor Richards also argues that this high threshold creates no 
incentive for informal caregivers to voluntarily assume control where there is 
foreseeable harm, and therefore the greatest risk to the public.102  Richards 
                                                 
94  Richards, supra note 76, at 655.  
95  Id. at 655, n.114. 
96  City of Covington v. Geylor, 19 S.W. 741, 741 (Ky. 1892). 
97  Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. 1965). 
98  Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048, 1052 (Conn. 1990). 
99   Carmona v. Padilla, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742–43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957). 
100  Richards, supra note 76, at 655. See also Bollinger v. Rader, 69 S.E. 497 (N.C. 1910); Fisher v. 
Mutimer, 12 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. App. 1938). 
101  Alva v. Cook, 123 Cal. Rptr. 166, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
102  Richards, supra note 76, at 658. 
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concludes that the right balance of incentives will only exist if caregiver 
immunity from liability is premised on reasonable measures to protect the 
public.103  This also appears to rest on foreseeability, but the onus shifts to the 
defendant and the threshold for liability would be lower than Emery.  Richards 
cites Irons v. Cole,104 in which a caregiver was found liable for harm to a third 
party when a mentally impaired adult family member accessed a gun on the 
caregiver’s premises.  For Richards, the logic of the case should be extended 
to more commonplace situations, such as where the implement of harm is a 
vehicle rather than a weapon (readily conceivable in an aging society).105  The 
argument is that a caregiver, no matter his or her altruistic motives, only 
deserves immunity if it can be established that he or she in no way contributed 
to the harmful act occurring.  This logic is evident in section 37 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  while reaffirming the basic principle that a 
plaintiff does not have an affirmative duty to prevent harms from a risk not of 
his or her creation, section 37 clarifies that this is “conditioned on the actor 
having played no role in facilitating the third party’s conduct, such as by 
providing a dangerous weapon to an insane individual.”106 
 
B. The United Kingdom and Australia 
 
While caregiver liability has not been explored in non-United States 
common law jurisdictions to the same extent, the case law in other 
jurisdictions contains clues as to how to overcome the doctrinal obstacles to 
such liability.  The allusion in Alva v. Cook above to “my brother’s keeper” 
refers (through the biblical usage) to a line of cases in the common law, 
culminating in United Kingdom House of Lords decisions in Home Office v. 
Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.107 and Smith v. Littlewoods Organization Ltd.,108 where 
a special or proximate relationship, such as control of prisoners or minors, was 
required before a defendant would, by omission, be liable for the wrongdoing 
of others.  In Smith, Lord Justice Goff held that there is also a general liability 
where “the defender negligently causes or permits to be created a source of 
danger, and it is reasonably foreseeable that third parties may interfere with it 
and, sparking off the danger, thereby cause damage to persons in the position 
of the pursuer.”109 
                                                 
103  Id. at 659. 
104  Irons v. Cole, 734 A.2d 1052 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998). 
105  Richards, supra note 76, at 657–58. 
106  AM. LAW. INST., supra note 69, at § 37. 
107  Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] UKHL 2, [1970] AC 1004 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
108  Maloco v. Littlewoods Org. Ltd. [1987] UKHL 18, [1987] 2 AC 241 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
109  Id.  
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The question, therefore, becomes one of whether a care relationship 
involving dementia falls within one of these special or general exceptions.  R 
v. Stone and R v. Dobinson explored the notion that a defendant may have 
“assumed” responsibility for the provision of care to the person, which can be 
contrasted with a mere omission.110  In that case, the Court found two 
defendants guilty of criminal neglect after failing to provide the “necessaries 
of life” to a family member over whom they had assumed care.  This was a 
criminal case and the person under care was the victim rather than the agent 
of harm.  Yet this line of jurisprudence provides an analogous basis for 
tortious liability for the acts of people with dementia to be directed back 
towards a care provider who has failed to acquit a positive, assumed duty of 
care.111   
 
With regard to the second difference, namely a victim who is a third 
party, a person who has assumed care could still be culpable on the following 
basis.  Under apportionment of liability principles operating in many common 
law jurisdictions, if a person with dementia causes harm to another and they 
are sued, they (or more likely, their legal guardian) could seek to join care 
providers as defendants to the litigation.  In this case, damages typically would 
be apportioned according to comparative culpability of the person and the 
caregiver.  In the case of harm resulting from the negligence of a person with 
dementia, the chain of causation linking the negligence of a caregiver in 
failing to provide adequate care, including taking steps to prevent wandering, 
for example, would potentially encompass personal liability to third parties.  
However, the court must be satisfied that the actions of the person with 
dementia did not constitute novus actus interveniens, i.e. a new intervening 
act which breaks the chain of causation, and hence disrupts the flow of 
liability. 
 
There is, therefore, some room in these jurisdictions to develop 
principles of caregiver liability beyond the high threshold of United States 
law.  Nevertheless, we can summarize that the basic approach in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia remains one of imposing liability 
for accidents upon the immediate actor regardless of mental impairment.  
Immediate actors are allocated liability largely based on public policy, rather 
than principle, although these reasons can overlap.   Such an assignment of 
                                                 
110  R v. Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 (Eng.). 
111  Note that the legal elements of criminal negligence are broadly similar to those of civil negligence, 
namely, existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, tested against the standard of the reasonable 
person’s conduct in the position of the caregiver; and harm caused as a consequence of that breach of duty. 
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liability regardless of mental impairment is problematic for a number of 
reasons.  First, imposing liability upon persons who may not be able to meet 
the common “reasonable person” standard is unjust and logically flawed.  
Second, the policy concerns underpinning many of the judgments adopting 
this approach convey a “norm of confinement” inconsistent with modern 
human rights norms.  Third, the goal of protecting the public is also neglected 
because the narrow exceptions to caregiver immunity that do exist are easily 
avoided by caregivers, especially in those cases where the caregiver is best 
placed to foresee and prevent the harm.  Observers of this system do, however, 
see potential for improvements given two conditions:  first, if caregiving 
behavior and concern for public safety are conceived of as mutually 
reinforcing; and second, if greater responsibility is placed on caregivers to 
justify their immunity from liability by being more mindful to ways in which 
the environment they create can contribute to accidents occurring. 
 
C. Caregiver Liability in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
 
Unlike the common law, civil law jurisdictions tend to premise 
responsibility for torts on mental capacity.  The origin for many jurisdictions 
is section 827 of the German BGB: “A person who, in a state of 
unconsciousness or in a state of pathological mental disturbance precluding 
free exercise of will, inflicts damage on another person is not responsible for 
such damage” unless the person “has temporarily induced such a state . . . .”112  
Liability may arise nonetheless under section 829, at least as far as equity 
between the parties allows, unless liability can be borne under section 832 by 
a person with a legal “duty to supervise.”113  Section 832 contains an 
                                                 
112  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 827, as amended by Article 2 (16) of the statute 
of 19 February 2007, translation at http://www.fd.ulisboa.pt/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Codigo-Civil-
Alemao-BGB-German-Civil-Code-BGB-english-version.pdf (“Exclusion and reduction of responsibility: A 
person who, in a state of unconsciousness or in a state of pathological mental disturbance precluding free 
exercise of will, inflicts damage on another person is not responsible for such damage. If he has temporarily 
induced such a state in himself with alcoholic beverages or similar means, he is then responsible for damage 
that he unlawfully causes in this state as if he were responsible because of negligence; responsibility does 
not ensue if he came into this state without fault.”). 
113  Id. at § 829 (“A person who, for reasons cited in sections 827 and 828, is not responsible for damage 
he caused in the instances specified in sections 823 to 826 must nonetheless make compensation for the 
damage, unless damage compensation can be obtained from a third party with a duty of supervision, to the 
extent that in the circumstances, including without limitation the circumstances of the parties involved, equity 
requires indemnification and he is not deprived of the resources needed for reasonable maintenance and to 
discharge his statutory maintenance duties. . . . Section 832 Liability of a person with a duty of supervision 
(1) A person who is obliged by operation of law to supervise a person who requires supervision because he 
is a minor or because of his mental or physical condition is liable to make compensation for the damage that 
this person unlawfully causes to a third party.  Liability in damages does not apply if he fulfils the 
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exemption from liability if the supervisor “fulfils the requirements of his duty 
to supervise or if the damage would likewise have been caused in the case of 
proper conduct of supervision.”  The policy behind these provisions is one of 
caregiver liability in principle, with some flexibility to safeguard equity for 
each of the parties. 
 
Japan adopted and adapted the provisions of the German BGB in the 
late nineteenth century.  The key provision is section 713 of the Civil Code, 
which states:  
 
A person who has inflicted damages on others while he/she lacks 
the capacity to appreciate his/her liability for his/her own act due 
to mental disability shall not be liable to compensate for the 
same; provided, however, that this shall not apply if he/she has 
temporarily invited that condition, intentionally or negligently.114 
 
Like Germany’s BGB, Japan’s section 714(1) imposes liability for 
third-party harm upon a person with a “legal obligation to supervise” a person 
without mental capacity.  The Japanese sections depart from their German 
origins in two respects.  First, a person without mental capacity is immune 
from both responsibility and liability.  Second, the scope of caregiver liability 
is apparently broader:  section 714(2) also imposes liability upon a person who 
has assumed supervision on behalf of a person who has the legal obligation to 
supervise.115 
 
Before 2000, case law on the Japanese provisions was relatively settled.  
A “person with the legal obligation to supervise” included a person with 
parental authority, an adult guardian, or a spouse.116  Judicial interpretation of 
the term had been informed by the pre-1999 Mental Health Act, which 
                                                 
requirements of his duty to supervise or if the damage would likewise have been caused in the case of proper 
conduct of supervision.”). 
114 MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 713, translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan). 
115  Id. art. 714, para. 1 (“In cases where a person without capacity to assume liability is not liable in 
accordance with the provisions of the preceding two Articles, the person with the legal obligation to supervise 
the person without capacity to assume liability shall be liable to compensate for damages that the person 
without capacity to assume liability has inflicted on a third party; provided, however, that this shall not apply 
if the person who has the obligation to supervise did not fail to perform his/her obligation or if the damages 
could not have been avoided even if he/she had not failed to perform his/her obligation.”); id. at para. 2 (“A 
person who supervises a person without capacity to assume liability, on behalf of a person who has the 
obligation to supervise, shall also assume the liability under the preceding paragraph.”). 
116  See Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 24, 2014, Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, KAKYŪ 
SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ (SAIBANSHO WEB) 1, 20–21, http://www.courts.go.jp. 
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imposed certain obligations upon guardians and spouses117 toward persons 
with a mental disability, for example to ensure that appropriate treatment was 
sought.118  A spouse’s obligation to supervise was also drawn from elsewhere 
in the Civil Code:  “a husband and wife shall live together and provide mutual 
cooperation and assistance.”119  This provision120 implied for cohabiting 
spouses a mutual duty of “personal supervision,” including a duty to take 
action when the other spouse loses independence through physical or mental 
disability,121 and thus, a duty to supervise.  Doctrine also developed with 
regard to other issues.  For example, liability for third-party harm could arise 
even in the absence of a professional diagnosis of mental impairment where 
there was a clear and present danger, the person was clearly experiencing a 
significantly abnormal condition, and in the past had experienced bouts of a 
similar nature.122 
 
Over the past decade, the trajectory of this doctrinal development and 
the fundamental principles underpinning supervisor liability faced challenges 
from the advent of the CRPD and reformed guardianship laws, greater 
prevalence of dementia, continued urbanization and fragmentation of 
communities, and evolving social values around care responsibilities.  An 
opportunity to revisit these principles arose in a recent landmark case 
exploring supervisor liability for a train accident.  The following Part 
examines this case in detail. 
 
IV. THE NAGOYA TRAIN ACCIDENT CASE 
 
In December 2007, a ninety-one-year-old man who suffered advanced 
dementia left his residence in Aichi Prefecture unnoticed by his daughter-in-
                                                 
117  Seishin hoken oyobi seishin shōgaisha fukushi ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Mental Health and 
Welfare for the Mentally Disabled], Law No. 123 of 1950, art. 20, amended by Law No. 615 of 2016. As 
discussed below, while this provision was deleted in 2011 to recognize the untenable nature of this duty in 
an ageing society, it was current law at the time of the incident in this case. See Memorandum, Hogosha 
seido, nyūin seido ni kansuru sagyō chīmu [Work Team on the Caregiver and Hospital Admission Systems], 
Kōsei Rōdōshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], Hogosha seido no minaoshi ni tsuite (kakuron 
goto no kentō) [On the Reforms to the Caregiver System (Discussion of Each Argument)] (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/2r985200000101rg-att/2r985200000101z5.pdf. 
118  See Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled, art. 22, para. 1 (imposing a duty 
to protect property interests and ensure medical treatment is given with regard to a person with mental 
disability), amended by Law No. 615 of 2016; id. para. 2 (requiring cooperation with doctors to ensure 
appropriate examination and diagnosis), amended by Law No. 615 of 2016. 
119  MINPŌ art. 752, translated in (JLT DS), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp. 
120  As well as notions of “good faith” and “common reason” (jōri) as applied to the marriage 
relationship. 
121  See Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB at 20–21. 
122  Memorandum, Work Team on the Caregiver and Hospital Admission Systems, supra note 117, at 5.  
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law, who was engaged in housework, and his wife, who had momentarily 
dozed off.  An hour later, having managed to board a train at a nearby station, 
he entered the grounds of another railway station and made his way through 
an unlocked gate to the tracks, where he collided with a passing train and was 
killed.  In 2013, a single judge of the Nagoya District Court held that the man’s 
eighty-five-year-old wife and his adult son were liable for economic harm 
(¥7.1 million) caused to the railway, mainly the costs associated with 
arranging alternate routes with different train companies for affected 
passengers.123  In 2014, a three-member panel of the Nagoya High Court 
upheld the earlier ruling, albeit only with regard to the appellant wife’s 
liability, which was reduced by fifty percent due to contributory negligence 
on the part of the respondent rail company.124  In 2016, the five-member 3rd 
Petty Bench of the Supreme Court of Japan overruled these judgments, 
finding neither the wife nor son liable.125  The following section outlines the 
reasoning adopted in the first and final appeal decisions. 
 
A. High Court Decision 
 
To begin with, the Nagoya High Court found that the fatal collision was 
not specifically foreseeable, which precluded a finding of personal liability 
for either the wife or son under section 709.  Wandering itself was foreseeable 
due to past behavior:  the man had gone missing on two occasions in the two 
years prior and had once required assistance from the police to return home.  
At other times, he expressed a desire to go to work, despite having retired 
many years earlier.  The accident itself was nonetheless not specifically 
foreseeable because the man had never attempted to board a train, enter a 
dangerous area such as train tracks, or even enter somebody else’s property 
without permission during a wandering incident. 
 
Second, the Court explored the possibility of “supervisor liability” 
under section 714, which is capable of broader application by the courts due 
to the apparent absence of the criterion of foreseeability.  This is because, 
according to the Court, this form of liability is not conceived upon direct fault 
for the harm, but is instead something akin to vicarious liability.  The “fault” 
in supervisor liability is instead that of being remiss in performing the duty of 
                                                 
123  Nagoya Chihō Saibansho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Aug. 9, 2013, Hei 22 (wa ワ) no. 819, 2202 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 68, available at WESTLAW 2013WLJPCA08096001. 
124  Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB at 1. 
125 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 1, 2016, Hei 26 (ju) no. 1434, 70 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 681, translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court: 2014 (Ju) 1434, SUP. CT. JAPAN, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1448 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
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supervision.  Moreover, being remiss is presumed by virtue of harm having 
occurred; the burden of proof to displace the presumption therefore lies with 
the supervisor.126  At the same time, the Court noted countervailing policy 
factors underpinning the Civil Code, including fair allocation of loss and 
liability in tort that is, in principle, fault-based.  These factors appear to have 
influenced the Court to nevertheless apply the criterion of foreseeability, at 
least to the question of whether the presumption of failed supervision could 
be rebutted in this case. 
 
As a preliminary issue, the High Court affirmed a spouse’s legal duty 
to supervise and rejected that the wife was excused through her own care 
needs (she received an official assessment of need for low-level care in early 
2006 for physical disabilities).  The Court held that supervision is qualitatively 
different than actual care and, according to the Court, she was capable of 
undertaking the role of supervisor of her husband’s care due to the support 
afforded her.  This included the assistance of the couple’s daughter-in-law, 
who had been the primary daytime caregiver since 2006.  It also included 
intermittent professional in-home care and institutional day care six days a 
week funded by national nursing-care insurance.  In contrast, the Court found 
that the couple’s adult son had no legal duty to supervise.  This was because, 
unlike a spouse, the duty in the Civil Code to support a “lineal relative by 
blood”127 was of an economic nature only.  Further, the son commuted from 
another city and did not live close enough to assume supervision on behalf of 
his mother. 
 
The central issue was, therefore, whether the wife could, as required by 
section 714, rebut the presumption of liability by demonstrating either that she 
was not remiss in fulfilling her supervisory duty or that the harm was 
unavoidable.  The Court held that the wife was remiss in her duty and was 
thus liable.  This was because there was sufficient unpredictability in the 
man’s behavior to create a general, foreseeable, and preventable risk that he 
would depart from his established patterns of behavior and meet with or cause 
harm as a result of wandering.  Furthermore, while the family had installed a 
sensor at the front door to monitor the man’s movements, the man left by a 
different door on the day of the accident.  This door could have been 
monitored readily (according to the Court) by replacing the battery in another 
                                                 
126  This presumption can only be overturned if the supervisor can establish that he or she was not remiss 
in performing the caregiver’s duty or that the harm would have occurred in any case. See MINPŌ art. 714, 
para. 1. 
127  Id. art. 877, para. 1. The provision also includes a duty to siblings. 
                        WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL               VOL. 27 NO. 2  434
sensor that had once been used as a shopfront bell and had been disconnected 
as a disturbance. 
 
Precisely because of the strict aspect of caregiver liability in Japan, 
there was no legal mechanism in the Civil Code for claiming contributory 
liability.128  Nevertheless, the Court fashioned a remedy that divided the loss 
equally between the rail company and the wife.  It invoked the spirit of fair 
distribution of loss that the Court saw as underpinning tort law.  This spirit is 
manifested in provisions of the Civil Code that were not directly applicable, 
specifically section 722(2), which provides for reduced liability for 
contributory negligence in standard (i.e. foreseeable) negligence cases.  
Furthermore, the Court engaged in a contextual assessment of fairness.  This 
included weighing the wife’s reasonable economic situation,129 her substantial 
(though ultimately inadequate) attempt to acquit her duty of supervision, the 
railway’s significant wealth,130 and the corporate responsibility of the railway 
to aspire beyond legal minimums to standards that promote the safety of 
vulnerable members of society such as children and those with dementia. 
 
B. Supreme Court Decision 
 
The Supreme Court delivered a joint judgment (Justices Kiuchi, 
Yamazaki, Ohashi) with an addendum (written by Justice Kiuchi), and 
separate judgments written by Justice Otani and presiding Justice Okabe.  
There was consensus that neither the wife nor the adult son was liable.  
However, there was disagreement over the question of the existence of a duty 
to supervise, which means the principles of caregiver liability remain 
unresolved in certain respects. 
 
The joint judgment held that a spouse has no legal duty to supervise, 
mainly because this duty cannot be founded in a spouse’s duty to provide 
mutual support, which is not directed at third parties.  Justice Kiuchi held that 
the legal framework attributing a legal duty to supervise to a spouse (or for 
that matter an adult guardian) has changed, which justifies a departure from 
precedent on this point.  Prior to reforms in 1999, a person automatically 
became a guardian upon a declaration of “mental incompetence” over his or 
                                                 
128  The existence of a fence, albeit unlocked, did constitute sufficient measures for the rail company to 
satisfy its duty of safety, thus preventing any counterclaim. See Hei 26 (ju) no. 1434, 70 MINSHŪ. 
129  This included several properties and ¥50 million in savings belonging to her deceased husband. See 
Hei 25 (ne ネ) no. 752, SAIBANSHO WEB at 41. 
130  JR East is Japan’s leading rail company with capital stock of over ¥100 billion at the time. Id. at 42. 
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her spouse.131  As guardian, the spouse had a duty to ensure appropriate 
treatment and was the primary person responsible under the Mental Health 
Act to undertake the duties of a “protector” (hogosha), including supervision 
to prevent harm to self and others.132  Since several anti-paternalistic 
amendments to the Mental Health Act in 1999, a “protector” must still ensure 
that a person with a mental illness or disability receives treatment, but there is 
no longer an obligation to prevent harm to self or others.  Furthermore, a 
spouse is no longer automatically appointed guardian.  Indeed, alongside the 
new guardianship regime and demographic changes, the percentage of non-
family members such as legal professionals appointed guardian has increased 
from 16% in 2003 to approximately 66% in 2014.133 
 
The judgment had implications for adult guardians as well as spouses.  
An adult guardian, according to Justice Kiuchi, bears merely an aspirational 
duty to ensure appropriate medical treatment and nursing care.  Although the 
guardianship reforms in 2000 created new duties to consider the views, 
lifestyle, and physical or mental situation of the protected person,134 these are 
guidelines for making decisions rather than a requirement to supervise.  In 
contrast, supervision—including that aimed at preventing harm to third 
parties—is an activity of a non-legal nature that falls beyond the scope of a 
guardian’s duties and authority.  Justice Otani disagreed on this point.  How, 
he asked, can a person assume a legal duty on behalf of another if there is no 
party (i.e. a guardian) that can be designated by law to bear that duty?  Justice 
Otani conceded that the actual labor of supervision has, since the 1999 
reforms, been expressly excluded from the scope of adult guardianship.  Yet 
there remains some scope for decision-making of a legal nature—such as 
contracting with public and private nursing service providers—to constitute a 
duty of supervision.  It is through this creation of a care plan and environment 
that a framework for preventing harm to third parties emerges.  Furthermore, 
for Justice Otani, the duty of supervision is given its contours by factors such 
as the duty of good management imposed upon guardians in the Civil Code.135  
This in turn explains how the concept of fault can be reintroduced into 
caregiver liability, where the precedents had been moving effectively towards 
no-fault liability. 
                                                 
131  MINPŌ arts. 840, 843, amended by Law No. 94 of 2013. 
132  See generally Act on Mental Health and Welfare for the Mentally Disabled, Law No. 123 of 1950 
(Japan).  
133  See Seinen kōken kankei jiken no gaikyō [Overview of Adult Guardianship Cases], SAIBANSHO WEB, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/kouken/index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
134  MINPŌ art. 858. 
135  See id. arts. 644, 852. 
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Justice Kiuchi, however, proposed an alternative argument to counter 
the issues raised by Justice Otani.  Specifically, Justice Kiuchi asserted that 
managers of care institutions have a legal duty to supervise due to their limited 
authority to restrain, which is granted under the Mental Health Act.  Indeed, 
he noted that the potential incentives to restrain are an additional reason to not 
regard family members and guardians as bearing a legal duty to supervise.  If 
the law imposed on guardians a duty to protect third parties, not only would 
the law create an excessive burden on protectors by requiring constant 
attention, it would also be inimical to the best interest of the protected. 
 
Having established that a spouse does not by law bear a duty to 
supervise, the joint judgment laid out the principles defining an assumed duty 
to supervise.  It held that the liability in section 714 could arise if, in the 
context of the relationship and involvement with the person without mental 
capacity, there were special circumstances where the supervisor’s duty had 
been assumed in a manner that exceeded simple supervisory activity and was 
directed at preventing harm to third parties.  This question is to be resolved 
objectively by: 
 
[T]ak[ing] into comprehensive consideration various 
circumstances . . . including whether said person has a 
relationship of being a relative of the mentally disabled person 
and how close their relationship is, whether they live together 
and how frequently they have daily contact, how said person is 
involved in the administration of the property of the mentally 
disabled person and other circumstances concerning said 
person’s involvement in the affairs related to the mentally 
disabled person, the physical and mental conditions of the 
mentally disabled person and whether and how the mentally 
disabled person shows problematic behavior in everyday life, 
and the actual care given by said person to the mentally disabled 
person depending on these factors.136 
 
These criteria are to be weighed “from the viewpoint of equity” while 
considering whether “it is possible and easy for said person to conduct 
supervision.”137  To counteract the incentives to restrain that would otherwise 
exist, Justice Kiuchi emphasized that the degree of difficulty entailed in the 
                                                 
136  Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2016, Hei 26 (ju) no. 1434, 70 MINSHŪ 681, translated in Judgments of the Supreme 
Court: 2014 (Ju) 1434, supra note 125. 
137  Id.  
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supervision is a crucial factor.  Applying these criteria to the wife and adult 
son, the joint judgment found that there were no such special circumstances 
because the wife could not be expected to prevent harm to third parties due to 
her own physical disability and the son was not physically proximate. 
 
Justices Okabe and Otani in separate judgments disagreed with the joint 
judgment as to whether the adult son had assumed the duty to supervise, but 
found that this duty had been met anyway.  For Justice Okabe, supervision 
could be assumed by creating a care plan and environment whereby harm to 
third parties is avoided and the day-to-day restraint which is necessarily part 
of supervision is delegated to others.  The care plan in this case provided 
supervised outlets for the desire to wander through daily outings to either 
institutional care or surrounding streets accompanied by the wife or daughter-
in-law.  Rooted in a perceived sense of responsibility as eldest son, the adult 
son was centrally involved in this care plan.  Moreover, it was apparent that, 
by trialing restraints in the form of locking outer doors and installing sensors, 
the adult son had made efforts to prevent harm to others.  Applying the criteria 
of the joint judgment, these factors amounted to special circumstances to the 
effect that the adult son had assumed the duty of supervision.  Nevertheless, 
Justice Okabe held that this duty was acquitted.  The criteria to be used in 
determining this includes a variety of factors, such as foreseeability and the 
scope of the ability to prevent the harm.  As a non-professional, the standard 
of care for the adult son was that of an ordinary reasonable person.  While the 
wandering was foreseeable, it was an unreasonable demand to require that he 
install functioning sensors at the exits to the house.  The adult son did not 
therefore neglect his duty to supervise. 
 
Justice Otani, who regarded an adult guardian as having a duty to 
supervise, agreed with Justice Okabe’s conclusion.  Considering the criteria 
typically used by family courts upon appointing an adult guardian (which 
were influenced by Civil Code obligations of mutual care within the family), 
the adult son was a prime candidate.  The son was in the position to arrange a 
care plan and that the son did indeed play a central role in this respect 
regardless of his lack of proximity.  The son could therefore be said to have 
assumed the duty of supervision.  The content of this duty aligns with the 
supervisory duty of an adult guardian.  That the scope of this duty is narrower 
than the pre-2000 position will, Justice Otani added, go some way to 
reconciling the principles to be applied here with contemporary social 
expectations.  On this standard, the son could be said to have been exempted 
from the presumption.  Not maintaining a sensor, which was originally 
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intended for customers anyway, did not detract from what was a praiseworthy 
care plan and environment. 
 
Ultimately, the Nagoya Train Accident Case held that the caregivers in 
the case were not liable.  However, the path taken to reach this conclusion 
differed in a number of respects among the judges.  While in the domestic 
context, this leaves several points of law unsettled, the diversity of opinion 
provides greater depth for comparison with current and potential common law 
approaches to the issue. 
 
V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CAREGIVER LIABILITY 
 
The juxtaposition of common law and civil law approaches to the 
liability in tort of persons with mental impairment and their caregivers 
highlights difficult and unresolved questions of principle, policy, and 
doctrine.  The imposition of civil liability on a person who is mentally 
impaired is problematic, but equally so is immunity from liability given 
presumptions of capacity under the CRPD.  However that question is resolved, 
the key follow-up question for any jurisdiction is the justification, if any, of 
attributing sole or joint liability to a caregiver.  This liability can be personal 
or derivative, flowing from either a legal or assumed duty of supervision.  The 
content of this duty is also contestable in its scope toward the mentally 
impaired person and, most controversially, toward third parties. 
 
A. Legal or Assumed Duty? 
 
The location of these principles within a code seems to place a 
considerable restraint on doctrinal development of the issue in civil law 
jurisdictions.  However, this difference should not be overstated.  Case law 
can develop codes in unexpected and contested directions.  The reasoning of 
the different judges in the Japanese judicial system above is reminiscent of 
the common law uncertainty evident in Emery, for example, where the Court 
was undecided on whether parents of an adult child were liable for third-party 
harm based on their parental status or because they assumed supervision of 
the adult child upon his release from an institution.138  It would seem that in 
both the United States and the United Kingdom, there is potential for liability 
in either situation.  In Japan, the wording of the provisions requires that 
analysis begins with identifying the person with a legal duty to supervise and 
                                                 
138  Emery v. Littlejohn, 145 P. 423, 424 (Wash. 1915). 
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then, if this duty cannot be acquitted, a person who has assumed the duty.  Yet 
opinions within the Japanese Supreme Court diverge as to who, if anybody, 
bears this legal duty. 
 
The justifications for making no assumption that a spouse or other 
family member (other than a parent of a minor) bears a supervisory or 
caregiver’s duty are consistent with contemporary values shared across 
jurisdictions.  Justice Kiuchi’s reasoning for regarding care institutions 
authorized to restrain as having this duty are compelling, in that informal 
caregivers and guardians should not be regarded as wielding this authority 
(though institutional authority too is increasingly subject to scrutiny).  In an 
age where volunteers and professionals are filling vacuums in families caused 
by demographic change, the view that an adult guardian should bear a legal 
supervisory duty, albeit in a narrower sense than in the past, also holds some 
merit.  Ultimately, however, there may not be a care institution or guardian 
available.  In many cases, therefore, the analysis will automatically begin with 
whether there is a party who can be said to have assumed a duty of 
supervision. 
 
B. Duty to Third Parties? 
 
If the assumption of a duty of supervision is the primary basis for third-
party liability, another unresolved question is how precisely a duty to 
supervise generates a protective role toward third parties.  It may be fruitful 
to draw an analogy with the liability of parents for the acts of minors, and 
indeed this is regulated by the same provision in Japan (section 714) because, 
depending on the child’s maturity, a minor may not have the mental capacity 
required for tortious liability.  The Supreme Court of Japan held in 2015 that 
a parent’s duty of supervision includes a duty to direct the child to take care 
not to cause harm to others when beyond the parent’s direct supervision.  The 
parent meets this duty, and therefore avoids parental liability, if the act that 
causes harm is not generally considered dangerous (in that case, kicking a 
soccer ball in an enclosed area) unless there are special circumstances that 
give rise to a specific foreseeable danger.  Yet the analogy between parents of 
minors and caregivers of mentally impaired adults breaks down due to the 
differences between a developing child, who becomes a full citizen under the 
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tutelage of his or her parents, and a person with mental impairment, who is 
not clearly under any tutelage at all and is certainly not an “ex-citizen.”139 
 
As highlighted from the analysis of the common law position in Part II, 
one argument for how a non-paternalistic supervisory duty could generate a 
protective duty to third parties is that the two duties are inextricably 
connected.  At the very least, the duties overlap:  where there is an apparent 
danger posed by a person with a mental impairment, taking protective action 
such as notifying authorities or taking the mentally impaired person to a doctor 
may meet both duties simultaneously.  This position is reflected in the Nagoya 
High Court’s rejection of a stand-alone duty to third parties.  Rather, 
preventing trespass and other third-party property violations was related to the 
duty to prevent harm to the mentally impaired person in cases where that 
person has little spatial awareness and expresses a desire to wander.  Not 
causing harm to another can also be considered one of the mentally impaired 
person’s interests in both of Ronald Dworkin’s senses: experiential, that is in 
the present moment, and critical, namely authoring one’s own life.140 
 
The theoretical interdependence of these duties is also supported in the 
adult guardianship literature.  Associate Professor Bruce Jennings provides a 
choice of models to conceptualize restrictions on the autonomy of sufferers of 
dementia.141  The first is the Public Health Model, “a regulatory basis in which 
the interests of others in not being harmed override the liberty interest of the 
individual.”142  This model is consistent with Mill’s ‘harm principle’ that only 
harm to others justifies state interference with individual liberty and involves 
the concomitant difficulties in defining harm.143  More concerning for 
Jennings, given the fluctuating nature of an individual’s dementia, is the 
tendency of this model to view persons “categorically rather than 
situationally” due to the “large populations, statistical risks, and impersonal 
factors” inherent in its focus.144 
 
                                                 
139 For accidents in the presence of the parent, it is more likely that direct liability will arise for the 
parent under MINPŌ art. 709. This is also true for caretakers and adult guardians (in common law 
jurisdictions), but does not assist in matters such as the Nagoya Train Accident Case where wandering was 
involved. 
140 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 230 (1993). 
141  Associate Professor Bruce Jennings is an adjunct professor in the Center for Biomedical Ethics and 
Society and the Department of Health Policy at the Vanderbilt Medical Center. 
142  Jennings, supra note 31, at 599.  
143  Id. at 598. 
144  Id. at 602. 
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The second model is the Guardianship Model.  Traditionally, this legal 
tool for substituted decision making has come into effect upon the loss of an 
individual’s capacity.145  While it has traditionally been justified by 
paternalism towards the individual rather than concern for public welfare, it 
can have an indirect effect on public safety.146  Yet Jennings is skeptical of 
this model as a means of locating appropriate interventions in the lives of 
persons with dementia in the name of public safety because this model tends 
to view capacity as an all or nothing concept.147  In addition to the danger of 
overriding autonomy excessively in the name of “best interests,” Jennings 
argues that the model is less useful for problematic behaviors at early stages 
of dementia.148 
 
In many respects, the Japanese position embodies the Guardianship 
Model.  Yet one might think that it was instead informed by a Public Health 
Model if one were to go by the reaction of the mass media and care 
professionals to the High Court decision.149  It was widely argued that the 
ruling would push dementia sufferers back into institutional care or create 
incentives for excessive physical restraints at home,150 and further isolation of 
families already suffering the stigma of dementia.151  Of the estimated 4.4 
million dementia sufferers in Japan, 2.8 million use services under the new 
Long-Term Care Insurance, and half of these users reside outside of 
institutional care in the community152—a rapidly growing proportion.153  This 
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is not always a matter of choice.  The waiting list for “special” aged care 
nursing homes, entry to which has strict means and merits tests, has reportedly 
reached 500,000 people.154  In this context, sections of the media criticized the 
High Court for failing to demonstrate an understanding of the complexity of 
caring for sufferers of dementia—which includes fluctuating capacity, 
challenging behaviors such as wandering, and the resulting strain155—and was 
therefore unrealistic in expecting 24-hour supervision on the part of a 
caregiver for the sake of public safety.156 
 
Some of these criticisms were misdirected.  The High Court’s precise 
words were that it is “necessary to have an awareness of the [person’s] 
activities to the extent that those activities do not cause physical harm were 
the person to disappear unnoticed.”157  While this seems to endorse the use of 
monitoring technologies such as sensors, it was tempered by a proportionality 
test focused on the interests of the person under care.  The High Court held 
that the permissible extent to which the freedom of a person “without mental 
capacity” could be restrained by a caregiver to prevent harm is “reasonable 
methods to oversee [the person’s] behavior, and restrain or supervise this 
behavior to the extent necessary, in order to prevent physical harm to that 
person from unsupervised wandering.”158  This point was not overruled on 
appeal:  Justice Okabe of the Supreme Court also assumed that day-to-day 
restraint is necessarily part of protective supervision. 
 
The Guardianship Model is therefore consistent with the notion that 
third-party liability is premised on protection of the mentally impaired person.  
However, as is evident in the Nagoya Train Accident Case, this model can 
signal a norm of confinement.  Furthermore, regardless of any test of 
proportionality, the Guardianship Model tends to employ a binary concept of 
capacity that is divorced from the question of individual functionality in a 
specific context. 
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The problem is, therefore, whether third-party liability can be generated 
through a caring relationship that is not premised on paternalism, a denial of 
capacity, and potentially confinement.  Such liability might be justified under 
the Conservator Model, which focuses on the care relationship and the 
importance of creating the support for a mentally impaired person to continue 
to flourish.  This support may entail providing alternative avenues to express 
individual identity to those that have become problematic behaviors (for 
example, driving, cooking, or wandering).159  One of the advantages of this 
model, according to Jennings, is that it creates opportunities for greater 
government, professional, and community involvement in activities that 
reintegrate persons with dementia into society.160  This has inherent value, 
may slow the onset of dementia,161 and can promote public safety through 
individual care and support.  The Conservator Model is the model most 
capable of promoting public safety in a manner that is consistent with modern 
notions of supported decision making and the rights of persons with 
disabilities. 
 
A central focus upon the care relationship and the person with a mental 
impairment has two implications for caregiver liability.  First, caregiver duties 
should proceed from the fact of the relationship rather than any preconceived, 
anachronistic notion of who should provide that care.  The duty should 
therefore be assumed voluntarily, independent of any statutory duty to provide 
care.  Second, interventions should be supportive rather than motivated by 
mere containment.  This in turn has implications for the use of psychotropic 
drugs and physical restraints, including new technologies such as GPS 
bracelets and surveillance via the Internet that, where involuntary, represent 
significant incursions on autonomy and may have counter-productive 
therapeutic outcomes.162  While an objection may be that a mentally impaired 
person could pose a threat to public safety, authority to restrain would lie 
instead in its standard repository, namely the police and like bodies, 
authorized (and restricted) by law for the specific purpose of preventing 
imminent harm to others.163  On this point, Richards predicts that greater 
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incidence of accidents would likely create the political conditions for police 
to be resourced more adequately to perform this role.164 
 
In addition to adequately resourced police, the Conservator Model 
cannot operate without other social supports.  This includes government 
programs providing services and education to facilitate a higher level of 
function in the community on the part of persons with mental impairment and 
greater capacity in the community for identification and management of risks, 
role-allocation, and decision-making processes relating to care and 
supervision.165  Civil society, businesses, and local governments can play 
important roles.  For example, in December 2013, Fukuoka City established 
a “wandering elderly search e-mail” (haikai kōreisha sagashite mēru) system 
calling on citizens to assist in searching for missing persons.  As of 2014, there 
were 2793 volunteers and 571 businesses registered.166  As of 2016, about half 
of Japan’s local government authorities have signed agreements with 
consumer co-operatives to enlist their efforts in keeping an eye on their 
members in the community with dementia.167  Further public support of such 
programs may be needed to ensure their viability and instigation where they 
cannot easily be expected to emerge spontaneously at a community level.168  
And yet these incipient programs demonstrate that, given the right 
environment, problematized behaviors such as wandering can be transformed 
into legitimate, purposeful behaviors that may obviate the need for restraints 
much of the time. 
 
In a sense, the growing supportive environment provided by both public 
and private bodies is a partial rediscovery of traditional family and communal 
bonds that performed a protective function in the past, the loss of which is the 
heart of the problem, rather than dementia itself.  This is not to suggest that 
the considerable social dislocation that has occurred through demographic 
change and urbanization in post-industrial societies can be reversed.  The 
possibility of modern collective approaches to behaviors such as wandering 
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does, however, have a bearing on questions of fairness and reasonableness.  
For example, there is a growing body of law in Japan addressing accidents 
suffered by the elderly and those with disabilities.169  The trend is for courts 
to impose reasonable standards of safety on everyday facilities, products, and 
residences based on the diverse level of physical and mental ability of those 
using the services.170  An important landmark in this respect was the Japanese 
Diet’s enactment in 2013 of the Act on the Elimination of Disability 
Discrimination.171  This evolving expectation that society should be livable 
for all persons, even the physically and mentally infirm, should also inform 
the level of restraint required to acquit a caregiver’s duty.  There are echoes 
of this view in the Nagoya High Court’s remarks on the social responsibility 
of the railway company to facilitate a safe environment for all. 
 
The Conservator Model shifts the focus to prevention rather than 
redress, but accidents will sometimes occur nonetheless.  In such cases, tort 
law may be the least efficient and equitable form of dispute resolution.  The 
arguments for retaining tort law as a mechanism for compensating negligent 
harm—such as emphasizing the deterrent effect or the moral aspect of fault—
are weaker, just as the arguments for alternative mechanisms better equipped 
to provide compensation are stronger.  Litigation trends in Japan reflect a 
growing awareness that dementia in particular creates challenges for an 
adversarial approach.  On the one hand, JR Kyushu and Nishi Nippon Railway 
have stated that while they will respond to each case individually, in principle 
they will claim for damages for train accidents because it is impractical for 
the railways to determine whether a passenger has dementia or not.172  On the 
other hand, in 2007, Kanrin City in Gunma Prefecture decided not to claim 
for costs against a family amounting to 10 million yen in living costs over 
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seven years for the institutional care of a woman with dementia while her 
identity remained unknown.173  The Mayor explained that the decision not to 
enforce filial duties in the Civil Code was taken from a “humanistic 
perspective” (jindōteki kenchi) and the view that dementia was a collective 
problem.174  Alternatively, where fairness demands compensation, some 
commentators have proposed the use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as conciliation as a future alternative to litigation.175  A 
similar trend can be seen in criminal law, especially as prisons become 
populated increasingly with the elderly.  For example, in a 2013 shoplifting 
case, the accused, who suffered dementia, was found not guilty and 
prosecutors opted not to appeal the District Court’s verdict.176 
 
As an alternative means of redress, socialized mechanisms for 
compensation like no-fault liability insurance schemes may obviate the 
unenviable task for courts of allocating loss among victims, mentally impaired 
tortfeasors, and their caregivers.  A state-sponsored or cooperative insurance 
system would also provide redress for victims, and would be justified by the 
fact that dementia is a risk faced by every member of the community.177  In 
many jurisdictions it is already possible to contract for individual 
compensation liability insurance as part of motor vehicle and disaster 
insurance.  However, some argue that risk-sharing regimes at a public and 
community level should be considered because it is not always clear whether 
events such as railway accidents are covered and the commercial viability of 
these schemes could be threatened if claimants increased proportionately to 
the expected increase in dementia.178  Cooperative insurance schemes that 
exist for people with intellectual disabilities in Japan could be a suitable 
model.179  Alternatively, funds could be dedicated from state welfare schemes, 
such as the Japanese Long-Term Nursing Insurance, just as they are for 
funding adult guardianship promotion activities.180 
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As modern societies age, it is inevitable that accidents involving 
persons with dementia will increase and come before the courts.  In many 
cases, the solution will lie outside the judicial system, whether through 
preventative strategies such as collective community support and education 
for caregivers, or solutions that redistribute harm collectively through means 
such as insurance.  Without these alternatives, tort law will remain an option 
for resolving civil disputes where a mentally impaired person has caused 
harm.  The Conservator Model, with its focus on the care relationship and 
reintegration into the community, may allow for third-party liability to be 
derived from a relationship of care or supervision. 
 
The Article argues that this form of liability should be considered, but 
only under the following conditions.  First, an assessment of liability should 
presume that the mentally impaired person has the capacity for responsibility, 
but that other parties have a role in supporting the person to exercise this 
capacity.  Liability should flow from this supportive role, rather than a 
protective duty.  Caregiver liability should be premised upon the notion that 
preventing third-party harm is integral to this supportive care relationship.  
Second, caregiver liability should only arise where a person has voluntarily 
assumed this supervisory role and is, as a result, in a unique position to assess 
and identify risks.  Third, liability should arise not from a failure to restrain, 
but only from a failure to take steps to avoid potentially dangerous behaviors 
through support, diversions, or contacting the authorities in extreme cases.  
Fourth, liability should be premised on a supportive external care and living 
environment in the community even where this does not yet exist.  Finally, 
the question of whether a caregiver has breached his or her duty of care could 
draw from the broad contextual criteria employed by the Supreme Court of 
Japan as applied to the particular facts.  This would ensure a role for 
community standards to interact with legal tests of proportionality in a way 
that would likely place an appropriately high threshold on establishing 
caregiver liability.  A flexible model of liability predicated on a subjective 
appraisal of the mentally impaired person’s capacity and the potential for 
some form of caregiver liability provides the best among problematic 
candidates for compensation of victims for the acts of persons with a mental 
impairment such as wandering.  Caregiver liability should, however, be 
premised upon the central position of the rights and interests of the person 
under care, the voluntariness of the care relationship, and a standard of care 
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that anticipates collective support for caregivers in the community, obviating 
the need for restraints in the name of paternalism or public safety. 
